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Abstract—We analyze the asymptotic key rate of the single
photon B92 protocol by using Renner’s security analysis given in
2005. The new analysis shows that the B92 protocol can securely
generate key at 6.5% depolarizing rate, while the previous
analyses cannot guarantee the secure key generation at 4.2%
depolarizing rate.
I. Introduction
The B92 quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocol [2] has
remained less popular than the famous BB84 protocol [1],
while both protocols provide the unconditional security. One
plausible reason for the unpopularity is that the B92 is weaker
to the channel noise than the BB84. Specifically, the BB84
with the standard one-way information reconciliation can gen-
erate secure key over the depolarizing channel at depolarizing
rate 16.5%, while the previous security analyses of the B92
cannot guarantee the secure key generation at depolarizing rate
3.5% [8], 3.7% [4] or 4.2% [7].
The conventional security analyses of the B92 [4], [7],
[8] involved many inequalities, and the tightness of those
inequalities was not explicitly discussed. We cannot exclude
the possibility that the B92 protocol can securely generate
key at depolarizing rates over 4.2%. On the other hand, the
asymptotic secure key rate in [7], [6] is expressed as the
minimum of conditional quantum entropy over a certain set
of bipartite quantum states. By using the convex optimization
technique, we can completely remove careful manipulation of
many inequalities, which could underestimate the secure key
rate. In this paper we reformulate the asymptotic secure key
rate formula as a convex optimization problem, and compute
the rate without any manipulation of inequalities directly by
a numerical optimization procedure. As a result, we show
that the B92 protocol [2] without noisy preprocessing [7] can
securely generate key at 6.5% depolarizing rate.
II. New Security Analysis of the B92 Protocol
In this section, we present a new formula for the asymptotic
key rate of the B92 protocol, based on Renner’s security
argument [6]. Firstly, we fix notations. Let {|0〉, |1〉} be some
fixed orthonormal basis of a qubit. In the B92 protocol [2],
Alice sends the quantum state
|ϕ j〉 = β|0〉 + (−1) jα|1〉, (1)
for j = 0, 1, where β =
√
1 − α2, and 0 < α < 1/
√
2. For
convenience of presentation, we also define
|ϕ¯ j〉 = α|0〉 − (−1) jβ|1〉.
We can see that {|ϕ j〉, |ϕ¯ j〉} forms an orthonormal basis of a
qubit.
On the other hand, we can express a qubit channel as
follows. Define the three Pauli matrices σx, σy, and σz as
usual. Then a qubit density matrix ρ can be expressed as [5]
ρ =
1
2
(
I + xσx + yσy + zσz
)
,
where x, y, z ∈ R and x2 + y2 + z2 ≤ 1. The vector (x, y, z)
is called a Bloch vector. The qubit channel EB from Alice to
Bob can be expressed as a map between Bloch vectors by

z
x
y
 7→ R

z
x
y
 + ~t, (2)
where
R =

Rzz Rzx Rzy
Rxz Rxx Rxy
Ryz Ryx Ryy
 , ~t =

tz
tx
ty
 . (3)
Define
|Ψ〉 = |0〉A|ϕ0〉B + |1〉A|ϕ1〉B√
2
.
As in [8], we also define the four POVM
F0 = |ϕ¯1〉〈ϕ¯1|/2, (4)
F1 = |ϕ¯0〉〈ϕ¯0|/2, (5)
F
¯0 = |ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|/2, (6)
F
¯1 = |ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|/2. (7)
After passing the quantum channel EB from Alice to Bob,
|Ψ〉〈Ψ| becomes
ρ1,AB = (I ⊗ EB)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|. (8)
In a quantum key distribution protocol, the state change EB
is caused by Eve’s cloning of the transmitted qubits to her
quantum memory. The content of Eve’s quantum memory is
mathematically described by the purification |Φ1,ABE〉 of ρ1,AB.
Let ρ1,ABE = |Φ1,ABE〉〈Φ1,ABE |.
In addition to Eve’s quantum memory, she also knows the
content of public communication over the classical public
channel between Alice and Bob. For each transmitted qubit
from Alice to Bob, the public communication consists of 1-bit
information indicating whether Bob discards his received qubit
or not. We also have to take it into account. We shall represent
the public communication by a classical random variable P
that becomes 1 if Bob discards his qubit and 0 otherwise. So,
P = 0 when Bob’s measurement outcome is F0 or F1, and
P = 1 when Bob’s measurement outcome is F
¯0 or F ¯1.
On the other hand, in the B92 protocol, Bob performs the
measurement specified by Eqs. (4)–(7). Alice and Bob keep
their a qubit if and only if its measurement outcome is F0 or
F1. Otherwise it is discarded and is not used for generation
of secret key. This is mathematically equivalent to set Alice’s
bit to 0 if the measurement outcomes is F
¯0 or F ¯1. Therefore,
from Eve’s perspective on Alice’s classical bit, the joint state
between Alice and Bob after the selection by measurement
outcomes is equivalent to
ρ2,ABEP = (IA ⊗
√
F0 ⊗ IEρ1,ABE IA ⊗
√
F0 ⊗ IE
+IA ⊗
√
F1 ⊗ IEρ1,ABE IA ⊗
√
F1 ⊗ IE) ⊗ |0〉P〈0|P
+|0〉A〈0|A ⊗ (
√
F
¯0 ⊗ IETrA[ρ1,ABE]
√
F
¯0 ⊗ IE
+
√
F
¯1 ⊗ IETrA[ρ1,ABE]
√
F
¯1 ⊗ IE) ⊗ |1〉P〈1|P.
Observe that the state change from ρ1,ABE to ρ2,ABEP is a trace-
preserving completely positive map.
Remark 1: Alternatively, by using the more usual approach
to model a quantum state after selective measurement, one can
also regard the quantum state after having Bob’s measurement
outcome F0 or F1 as
1
(F0 + F1)TrA[ρ1,AB] (IA ⊗
√
F0 ⊗ IEρ1,ABEIA ⊗
√
F0 ⊗ IE
+IA ⊗
√
F1 ⊗ IEρ1,ABEIA ⊗
√
F1 ⊗ IE) ⊗ |0〉P〈0|P.
The motivation behind using our alternative formulation (9) is
to prove later the convexity of the quantum conditional entropy
(9) in terms of the parameters given in Eq. (3), so that we can
use the convex optimization technique to find the minimum
value of Eq. (9).
In order to calculate the key rate, we need to consider Eve’s
ambiguity on Alice’s classical bit [7], [6] defined as follows.
Let
ρ2,XEP =
∑
j=0,1
| j〉A〈 j|A ⊗ IEPTrB[ρ2,ABEP]| j〉A〈 j|A ⊗ IEP .
Eve’s ambiguity on Alice’s classical bit S (X|EP) is defined as
S (X|EP) = S (ρ2,XEP) − S (ρ2,EP), (9)
where ρ2,EP = TrA[ρ2,XEP], and S (·) denotes the von Neumann
entropy.
In order to calculate the amount of public communication
required for information reconciliation, we define the joint
random variables (X′, Y′) as
X′ = j if the transmitted qubit is |ϕ j〉,
Y′ = k if the measurement outcome is Fk, (10)
under the condition that the measurement outcome is either
F0 or F1. Observe the difference between X and X′. X′ is not
defined but X is defined to be 0 when Bob’s measurement
outcome is either F
¯0 or F ¯1.
We shall show the asymptotic key rate per single transmitted
qubit that is neither announced for the channel estimation nor
discarded due to the measurement outcome being F
¯0 or F ¯1.
Note that Eq. (9) is Eve’s ambiguity per a qubit that is not
announced for the channel estimation but can be discarded.
The probability of the measurement outcome being F0 or F1
is
Tr[ρ1,AB(IA ⊗ (F0 + F1))].
So we can see that Eve’s ambiguity per single transmitted
qubit that is neither announced for the channel estimation nor
discarded is
S (X|EP)
Tr[ρ1,AB(I ⊗ (F0 + F1))] .
By [7], [6] the asymptotic key rate is
S (X|EP)
Tr[ρ1,AB(I ⊗ (F0 + F1))] − H(X
′|Y′). (11)
Note that the above formula assumes that Alice and Bob
knows the channel between them. In the BB92 protocol, we
cannot estimate all the parameters of the channel. We can
only estimate part of them. In Eq. (11) we can asymptotically
determine the true values of Tr[ρ1,AB(I ⊗ (F0 + F1))] and
H(X′|Y′). On the other hand we cannot know the true value of
S (X|EP). Therefore, we need to calculate the minimum value
(i.e. the worst-case) of S (X|EP) over all the possible quantum
channel EB between them.
One can compute the minimum of S (X|EP) as follows. Ob-
serve first that S (X|EP) is a function of the channel parameters
Eq. (3) of EB. By the almost same argument as [9, Remark
11] one sees that S (X|EP) is a convex function of the channel
parameters Eq. (3). Moreover, we see that the minimum of
S (X|EP) is attained when Rxy = Ryx = Ryz = Rzy = ty = 0
by the almost same argument as [9, Proposition 1]. Therefore,
one can compute the minimization of S (X|EP) by the convex
optimization [3].
III. Numerical Result
We consider the depolarizing channel Eq with depolarizing
rate q. The definition of q follows [8]. For a qubit density
matrix ρ, we have Eq(ρ) = (1 − q)ρ + (q/2)I2×2. With such a
channel Eq, R and ~t in Eq. (2) are given by
R =

1 − 4q/3 0 0
0 1 − 4q/3
0 0 1 − 4q/3
 , ~t =
~0.
Define
ρ1,AB,q = (I ⊗ Eq)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|.
Over Eq with infinitely many qubits, the asymptotic key rate
is given by
min S (X|EP)
Tr[ρ1,AB(I ⊗ (F0 + F1))] − H(X
′|Y′), (12)
where the minimum is taken over the set of parameters in Eq.
(3) such that
Tr[(|0〉〈0| ⊗ F0 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ F1)ρ1,AB]
= Tr[(|0〉〈0| ⊗ F0 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ F1)ρ1,AB,q], (13)
Tr[(|1〉〈1| ⊗ F0 + |0〉〈0| ⊗ F1)ρ1,AB]
= Tr[(|1〉〈1| ⊗ F0 + |0〉〈0| ⊗ F1)ρ1,AB,q]. (14)
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Fig. 1. Asymptotic Key Rate: The conventional methods [4], [7], [8] cannot
generate key at depolarizing rate above 4.2% and they are not plotted.
We also required that parameters in Eq. (3) represent a
completely positive map. We stress that we do not restrict
the range of minimization to the depolarizing or the Pauli
channels. The minimization is carried out over the set of all
the qubit channels with (13) and (14).
The FindMinimum function in Mathematica 8.04 was used
for the minimization. The program source code and the
computation results are included in this eprint.
We only considered α = 0.39 and did not optimized the
value of α in Eq. (1). The key rate is plotted in Fig. 1. The
convex optimization did not converge in 105 iterations when
the depolarizing rate ≤ 4.5%. The key rate is plotted from
depolarizing rate ≥ 4.6%.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we reformulated the secure key rate formula
of the B92 protocol as a convex optimization. We have not
resorted to skillful manipulation of inequalities, and the secure
key rate is computed simply by a numerical optimization
procedure. The result shows that the B92 protocol can securely
generate key at significantly higher depolarizing rates than
previous security analyzes.
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